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Abstract
The depth and breadth of the East Asian financial crisis has
added a sense of acute urgency for some concrete and credible
measures by policy-makers to revitalise the Japanese economy.
While steps to be taken for the long-run competitiveness and
economic revitalisation of the Japanese economy are clear (with the
only doubt being about whether and how effectively they will be
implemented), those needed to boost aggregate demand in the short-
run are far less obvious. Given the near-zero nominal interest rates in
Japan, most observers argue that an expansionary monetary policy
would be ineffective. However, as with Krugman (1998a,b), we argue
that once a distinction is made between real and nominal interest
rates, it is logically possible for monetary policy to be effective in
raising demand if it is able to create inflationary expectations. This
could probably be effected through explicit announcements by the
Bank of Japan of the intention to target a certain inflation rate in the
future.4
1. Background and Motivation
          Japan, the world’s second largest economy and largest creditor nation, has
been relatively stagnant since the early 1990s following the bursting of the real
estate and stock market bubbles of the 1980s. This has contrasted sharply with the
relative dynamism of the world’s largest economy, the US, during this period (Chart
1). Things turned particularly bleak in 1998, with a full-fledged recession (defined as
two consecutive quarters of negative growth), the first since 1974 (JRI, 1997a and
Sugawara, 1998a). Accordingly, its unemployment rate which is currently slightly
over 4 percent, is expected to surpass that of the US if the current growth trends in
the two countries persist (Charts 2 and 3)
1. Grave fears remain about “Japan being
sucked into a deflationary spiral” (The Economist, 1998, June 20 and Tett and
Harney, 1998) (Chart 4)
2, with real wages declining on a year-on-year basis since
the fourth quarter of 1997 (EIU, 1998b).
                                           
1 Japan’s effective unemployment rate will look relatively worse than the 4 percent figure
once account is taken of the extent of underemployment, given Japan’s life-time employment
‘guarantee’  or ‘employee-friendly’ attitude (Graham, 1998 and Sugawara, 1998b). Forecasts
by JP Morgan (1998b) and DRI (1998) are for the unemployment rate in Japan to reach 4.6-
4.8 percent in 1998 and 5.2-5.3 percent in 1999.
2 To be sure, while consumer price growth has remained slightly positive, domestic wholesale
prices fell on a year-on-year basis in 1996 by 1.6 percent and were flat in 1997. Wholesale






There have been a number of high-profile bank failures since late 1995, the
most spectacular being the recent closure of Yamaichi Securities, the fourth largest
brokerage house in Japan (ICR, 1998 and The Economist, November 29, 1997,
pp.87-8). In 1995 itself, Koichi Hamada (1995, pp.274-5) had noted that “the
seriousness of current financial troubles can be regarded as being historically
unprecedented since the financial crisis of 1927...(which)...was a forerunner of the
world-wide Great Depression.”
            American banks were the predominant external creditors in the cases of the
Mexican-Tequila crisis in 1994-95 and during the Latin American debt crisis of the
early 1980s. In contrast, Japanese (and less so European) banks were responsible
for the bulk of lending (about 30 percent) to the crisis-hit East Asian economies, viz.
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Korea (Table 1)
3. The financial crisis in East Asia
has thus contributed to an aggravation of the financial sector malaise in Japan, with
banks forced to ‘cut losses’ by refusing to roll-over existing loans, let alone extend
new ones (Chart 5)
4. This has created a vicious spiral of illiquidity, leading possibly
to insolvency and a consequent worsening of net asset positions of the (Japanese)
creditors
5. In turn, this deterioration of financial intermediation abilities and functions
                                           
3 A point not always appreciated is the existence of significant intra-regional variations
among the East Asian economies. Thus, in this case, Japanese bank lending has ranged
from a low of 15 percent in the Philippines to highs of 38 percent in Indonesia and Thailand
(Table 1).
4 Indeed, Japanese banks have reportedly been amongst the most reluctant of creditors to
work towards systematic debt restructuring (not to mention outright forgiveness) of the debts
of the most afflicted East Asian economies (Kagda, 1998 and Lee, 1998).6
of Japanese banks has exacerbated the domestic and regional credit crunches (and
thus the financial crisis), as they seek to enhance their balance sheet situations
6.
Table 1
Nationality of Banks Providing Loans to Selected East Asian Economies, June 1997
(US$ billion)
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Insert Chart 5
All these problems and weaknesses in Japan have contributed to general
pessimism about its short and medium-term prospects. Compounding these have
been the political uncertainties following the heavy election defeat by the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the upper house on July 12, 1998, and the
consequent resignation of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto the next day
7. Against
this back-drop, the US financial credit agency Moody’s announced on July 23 that it
was considering a possible review and downgrading of Japan’s country debt rating
                                                                                                                            
5 According to ING Baring Securities, Japan’s non-performing loans (NPLs) to the rest of Asia
doubled since the crisis to ¥6 trillion (The Economist, April 18, 1998, p.75).
6 The perceived vulnerability and low credit standing of Japanese banks is seen from the fact
that all banks have to pay a ‘Japan premium’ on borrowings from international capital
markets. This risk premium - referred to as the Harberger premium after UCLA economist
Arnold Harberger (1980) - for even the best Japanese banks, is between 0.4 to 0.6 points
above base rates (ICR, 1998, p.113).
7 The LDP won just 44 of the 126 seats up for grabs in the Upper house. However the LDP is
as of yet not in danger of losing its grip on power (Landers, 1998a). This is so, as of
importance as far as choosing the Prime Minister is concerned, is the Lower house, where it
currently enjoys the absolute majority.7
from its top-notch AAA grade (Rowley, 1998a). While such a move is questionable
in light of Japan’s status as the world’s largest creditor nation (with about US$900
billion in overseas assets), it does emphasise the dramatic deterioration of and the
precarious state of confidence in the growth prospects of the Japanese economy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section
summarises the importance of a robust Japanese economy (including a stable and
‘strong’ yen) for the rest of East Asia. Section 3 discusses the long and short-term
economic policy implications for the Japanese economy. Section 4 focuses on
short-term demand management policies (viz. fiscal versus monetary policies). The
penultimate section details the analytics and importance of ‘inflation-inducing’
monetary policy in boosting short-term demand in Japan. Potential drawbacks of
such a policy are also highlighted and rationalised. The final section provides a
summary and concluding observations.
2. Consequences of a Sluggish Japanese Economy and Weak Yen for East
Asia
Nominal interest rates in Japan - which are close to zero (Charts 6 and 7) -
cannot be raised for fear of the damaging effects it could have on:
i)    the domestic banking sector (which is very fragile);
ii)  the already highly depressed stock market - which has trailed other major
industrial stock markets (Charts 8 and 9); as well as
iii) the fairly large government deficit (Chart 10) and public debt (Chart 11 and
section 2.1)
8.
                                           
8 Most observers opine that once the Nikkei index falls below a certain ‘trigger’ level
(estimated at 16,000 points), a number of Japanese banks will lose their ‘hidden capital
gains’ in the form of large shareholdings in corporate customers and affiliated firms, which
were purchased at a significant discount (below value). These ‘latent losses’ will further
lessen the lending propensities of the banks, particularly so if the 8 percent capital adequacy
ratio mandated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is in threat of being breached






All these have in turn caused unprecedented weakness in the yen relative to
US$ (Chart 12). The yen fell to about 145 per US$ on June 12, 1998, an all-time low
since 1991, and way below the peak of about 80 in April 1995. This sharp drop in
the US$ value of the yen was despite a US$20 billion intervention by the Japanese
authorities. A smaller but highly symbolic joint US$4 billion intervention by the US
and Japanese monetary authorities on June 19, 1998 - reportedly divided almost
evenly between the two countries - did help to prop-up the yen slightly. But this
proved to be only a temporary respite, as the yen fell back to about 141 to the US$
as at July 4, 1998 (Sanger, 1998a)
9.
Insert Chart 12
The weak yen and sluggish domestic demand have stalled economic
recovery in East Asia through a number of transmission channels (see Table 2).
Table 2

































                                                                                                                            
using the postal savings and pension funds to keep the Nikkei at around the 16,000 level.
9 The significance/symbolism of this joint intervention ought not to be under-rated. There
have been only two other precedents for such a joint action: the ‘Plaza Accord’ in mid 1985 to
































Source:  Bhaskaran (1998)
First, the weak yen has partly offset the depreciation of the Korean won and
the Taiwanese $ and therefore their economies’ cost competitiveness - given their
broadly similar comparative advantage (chart 13)
10.
Insert Chart 13
Second, the weak yen has reduced the relative attractiveness of assets in
East Asia, thereby diminishing the incentive for Japan to undertake foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the region (so-termed ‘wealth effect’)
11. This problem is
particularly true of China, which is the only country in the region whose currency has
not depreciated in nominal terms since the official devaluation in 1994 (see Fernald,
et al., 1988). Apart from this wealth effect, to the extent that a substantial part of
lending to the region by Japanese banks is to subsidiaries of Japanese companies,
the acute and growing financial sector problems in Japan may be expected to have
                                           
10 The impact on Korea may be questioned in light of the almost 45 percent depreciation in
the won during July 1997-July 1998 in nominal terms. However, given zero price increase or
even deflation in Japan on the one hand, and the relatively high inflationary pressures in
Korea on the other, seen in real terms (i.e. real exchange rate), the worries for Korea may be
legitimate. Indeed, real effective exchange rate computations by JP Morgan (1998b, p.6) is
revealing. Between September 1997 and December 1997, Korea’s real effective exchange
rate depreciated by 31 percent, but the depreciation between September 1997 and June
1998 was only 19 percent (given the nominal appreciation of the Korean won, depreciation of
yen and other regional currencies and higher inflation rate in Korea relative to some of its
trading partners, including Japan). In contrast, while Japan’s real effective exchange rate
essentially remained stable between September 1997 and December 1997, it depreciated by
about 10 percent between September 1997 and June 1998. If current trends persist, the
initial advantages of the sharp nominal depreciation of the won in 1997 and early 1998 will be
completely eroded (relative to Japan).
11 The wealth effect of a change in the real value of the yen has been shown to be a
significant factor determining Japanese regional FDI (Goldberg and Klein, 1997). Thus, there
was a surge in Japanese FDI following yen appreciation between 1986-89 and again in 1992-
95, with there being a sharp drop off between 1989-91 when the yen depreciated (Kawai,
1997).10
a further negative impact on FDI.
Third, despite the pronouncements to the contrary by high-ranking Chinese
leaders (see for instance, Kwang, 1998), there is also the ‘psychological’ aspect, in
which financial market participants have convinced themselves that continued
weakness in the yen will necessitate a depreciation of the Chinese renminbi
12. It is
popularly argued that a renminbi devaluation in turn may then add to the pressures
for the Hong Kong $ peg to be revoked (or conversely, the Hong Kong $ peg may
be broken, which in turn could negatively affect the renminbi - see footnote 14)
13. If
this occurs, another round of ‘competitive devaluations’ in the region cannot be
discounted
14,15.
Fourth, and probably most important, the weak yen and sluggish demand
growth in Japan have thus far precluded any sort of economic recovery in the crisis-
hit East Asian economies through exporting to Japan, as part of a broader strategy
                                           
12 Fong (1998) has suggested that Chinese officials are of the view that a yen per US$ rate of
160-165 will be the ‘pressure point’ at which the Chinese yuan will ‘have to be’ devalued,
while other analysts have suggested the range is more like 150-155 yen to the US$. See
Dornbusch (1998) and Tao (1998) for two succinct articles on reasons why it would be in
China’s self-interest not to devalue the renminbi.
13 While this may indeed happen, the economic rationale is not convincing (recognising
though that often, perception may be more important than reality in short-term asset market
fluctuations and pricing). To the extent that a lower renminbi does not hurt the Chinese
economy, and if anything, may possibly enhance its export competitiveness (albeit slightly),
Hong Kong may actually stand to benefit, given its role in servicing mainland trade. Further,
a weaker yen (relative to renminbi) would imply that the local value of debt burden owed by
China to its Japanese creditors would decline (Table 2). Admittedly though, the net impact of
a yen devaluation on China (and thus Hong Kong) is not as straightforward. For instance, at
least two broad factors counter the above ‘positive impact’ of a yen depreciation. First, about
25-30 percent of China’s foreign exchange reserve holdings (roughly estimated currently at
about US$140 billion) are denominated in yen (Harding, 1998). Second, a significant
proportion  of Japanese loans are channeled to Japanese subsidiaries on the one hand, and
there is also a net positive impact of a strong yen on FDI to the East Asian region on the
other, as discussed in this section.
14 It is sometimes forgotten that China does not allow for capital account convertibility.
Accordingly, while bearishness about the currency will invariably lead to some capital flight
(illegally) as well as the creation and flourishment of parallel markets (which tend to
understate the true market value of the renminbi due to a risk premium), a direct short-selling
of the renminbi - as outlined in Rajan (1998) and as happened in the other East Asian
economies - cannot occur.
15 This is reportedly the reason for the US Treasury’s intervention in the foreign exchange
markets to help stabilise the yen, the timing of the action coinciding exactly with the US11
of “exporting themselves out of trouble”. On the contrary, the fear is that a weak
yen, by making Japanese goods relatively more competitive, could allow Japan to
expand exports to extra-regional economies at the expense of the other East Asian
economies (Lincoln, 1988, p.65). There’s a ‘double whammy’ in operation here, in
that it is generally found that Japanese FDI in the East Asian region is trade-
creating (see Rajan, 1996 and references cited within). In particular, it spurs exports
(to the US mainly and less so to Japan), while concurrently stimulating imports of
intermediate goods and components from Japan (Goldberg and Klein, 1997). Thus
a weak yen could have a depressing impact on regional trade.
Fifth, a weak yen along with stagnant/declining real wages will reduce the
demand for luxury items such as overseas holidays by Japanese. In fact, according
to a  survey by the Japan Travel Bureau (JTB), every sector of outbound travel from
Japan (i.e. business and leisure) was expected to worsen in 1998 (JRI, 1998)
16.
Reduced numbers of Japanese tourist arrivals (or expenditure per Japanese tourist)
can be expected to have a significant negative impact on the regional countries,
especially those that were depending on it as an important source of foreign
currency.
In light of the above, there is a growing feeling among regional policy-makers
and most observers that, far from being part of the solution, Japan has hitherto
been a large part of the problem as far as the East Asian financial crisis is
concerned. This is in sharp contrast to America’s role during the Tequila crisis.
Specifically, at that time, the US was seen to have been extremely open (benign?)
to exports from Latin America, in recognition of the need for the crisis-hit economies
(viz. Mexico and Argentina) to increase exports as a means of stimulating growth
and reducing external debt burdens (Tanaka, 1998).
                                                                                                                            
president’s visit to China (Sanger, 1998a).
16 Latest data reveals a decline in the number of Japanese vacationing abroad during the
traditional ‘obon’ summer break. This was the first decline in eighteen years (Straits Times,12
3. Policy Implications: Long-Term Versus Short-Term Policies
Japanese economic policy must involve a two-pronged strategy.
First, medium and longer-term recovery require that financial sector malaises
be tackled, particularly with regard to the quick disposal of non-performing loans
(NPLs), which are conservatively estimated at anywhere between ¥70 and ¥100
trillion (Sanger, 1998b, Shikano, 1998 and Smith, 1998).  While accurate estimates
of recapitalisation needs of Japanese banks are unavailable, figures suggested
range from a low of 10 percent to as high as 20 percent (Table 3).
Table 3
Recapitalisation Needs of the Banking Sectors of Selected East Asian Economies,
1998 Estimates (%)
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In this light, belated but nevertheless of significance, is the recent package
of reforms to be implemented over a five-year period to complement the ‘Big Bang’
proposal (outlined in mid 1997). The Big Bang is aimed at deregulating the financial
market by the Year 2001 (Sakae, 1997 and Smith, 1998). Most notably, the reforms
include the establishment of bridge banks to acquire failing financial institutions
while maintaining credit availability to commercially viable ones (Chart 14). Though
details are yet unavailable, indications are that the bridge bank proposal shares
broad similarities with the US Resolution Trust Corporations (RTC), which were
established in the 1980s in order to liquidate assets of failed Savings and Loans
                                                                                                                            
August 18, 1998).    13
(S&Ls).
Insert Chart 14
It must be said though that the comparison with the S&L debacle in the US
may not be entirely appropriate. The bad loan problem has impacted virtually all
major banks in Japan (with the top 19 accounting for about 60 percent of total
banks loans in the country), while the S&Ls were only a small part of the overall
financial system in the US (US banks and other institutions remained unaffected).
As such, there existed a number of potential buyers of the S&Ls in the US. This
does not exist in Japan. Further, costs involved in resolving the bad debts in the
S&L crisis amounted to some US$160 billion or 2.7 percent of US GDP. In
comparison, the bad debt resolution costs-to-GDP ratio in Japan, even
conservatively estimated, is expected to be double digit (well over 10 percent of
GDP). This has led to some skepticism that the bridge bank scheme may be meant
more as a means of ‘saving’ or prolonging the lives of weak banks, rather than at
restructuring the Japanese financial system. Accordingly, more innovative, market-
based schemes, such as the securitisation of bad debts as outlined by Ezrati
(1998), may be considered in parallel with the bridge bank plan.
The overall financial restructuring effort must be accompanied by other
supply-side measures that enhance the structural flexibility of the Japanese
economy (such as revoking life-time employment, allowing for greater market14
access to FDI and imports into Japan, further relaxation or preferably, complete
dissolution of the Large Scale Retail store Law which effectively protects local
merchants from retail competition). It must be added though, that while important
initiatives have been announced in recent times, political economy compulsions
have led to much market-skepticism regarding the commitment of the Japanese
authorities towards their actual implementation (see for instance, Lincoln, 1998)
17.
Second, for reasons noted above, there is an urgent need for measures to
improve short-term growth prospects in Japan. This is needed in order to help
stabilise/(strengthen?) the yen, as well as to assist the region directly by allowing
increased exports to Japan as part of an export-led recovery. Nomura (1998) has
estimated that for every 1 percent increase of Japanese GDP growth, the crisis-hit
East Asian economies will grow an additional 0.13 percent on average
18. In view of
the seeming absence of outright debt repudiation or forgiveness and limited/partial
and snail-paced systematic debt workout agreements, the need for the regional
economies to export/grow their way out of indebtedness cannot be sufficiently
emphasised
19.
Short-term strategies must focus on reflating the economy through
aggregate demand management policies, i.e. monetary and/or fiscal. The Japanese
                                           
17 This is particularly so following the upper house election defeat by the LDP. It remains to
be seen if the ruling party is able to muster sufficient votes in the upper house to pass
legislation pertaining to some of the important reforms (The Economist, August 15, 1998,
pp.65-6).
18 The country-specific growth boosts are as follows: Korea 0.10 percent, Indonesia 0.11
percent; Malaysia 0.27 percent, Thailand 0.15 percent, and the Philippines 0.14 percent
(Nomura, 1998).
19 The tight monetary policy stance maintained in the crisis-hit economies as part of IMF-
mandated conditions, has been a further reason that has precluded an export-led recovery
from taking place. There are indications that some of the regional economies (Malaysia and
Thailand in particular) are leaning towards easing interest rates to help stimulate growth.
While this may have merit (given the high leverage ratios of most of the firms in the region),
the worst case scenario of such a policy, if implemented prematurely, is that it could lead to
selling pressures on the currencies, with consequent depreciation-cum-inflationary spirals
(Rajan, 1998 discusses this issue in more detail).15
Economic Planning Agency (EPA) announced in December, 1997 that “personal
consumption is at a standstill” (quoted in ICR, 1998, p.106), while planned business
investment has also fallen sharply (JP Morgan, 1998b). The other component of
private expenditure, viz. exports, have also seen a sharp decline recently. This is
mainly due to the deep recessionary conditions in Asia, which account for about 40
percent of Japan’s total exports (JP Morgan, 1998b). This excess aggregate
expenditure over output is reflected in a rapid build-up of inventories (Chart 15)
20.
Insert Chart 15
Insofar as the US experience with the RTC and S&Ls is indicative, if the
bridge bank scheme is implemented in spirit as part of an overhaul of the banking
system, it will in all probability deepen the spending glut. This is so, as the shutting
down or restructuring of problem-banks will, other things being equal, lead to a
reduction in aggregate bank lending on the one hand, while some part of the
financial sector bailout/cleanup would inevitably be borne by the tax payers on the
other. Conversely, if stimulus measures are effective, there ought to be fewer
corporate failures, while asset prices should strengthen, hence mitigating the NPL
problems of banks (given that loans are tied to asset values). Given the above, the
need for effective and timely actions aimed at stimulating aggregate demand
becomes readily apparent
21. Wolf (1998) put it best when he stated:
Japan suffers from a chronic structural complaint and a critical
                                           
20 This is just a restatement of the national income accounting equation. This states that if
planned national savings exceeds planned domestic investment plus net exports (or
alternatively, planned output exceeds planned expenditures), there will be an unplanned
accumulation of inventories (i.e. over and above desired inventory holdings).
21 Of course, one may argue that the announcement/implementation of credible structural
policies may lead to general optimism of the country’s growth prospects, thus stimulating
private investment and household consumption. Nevertheless, the ‘stop-go’ nature that has
characterised economic policies in Japan thus far, will, in all probability, add to uncertainties.
Therefore, private spending may actually be held back by risk averse economic agents.
However, even if one were to grant the possibility of optimism-driven spending, it will
probably be more than outweighed by the ‘liquidity channel’ (i.e. the expectation that tax-
payers will have to share at least part of the restructuring costs).16
demand condition. To focus on the chronic complaint is to risk
aggravating the critical condition. The priority is to boost demand, to
cushion the economy during the needed reform. The question is how.
4. Short-term Strategies: Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy
Discount rates in Japan were lowered nine times between July 1991 to
September 1995, reaching a historic low of 0.5 percent (Kawakita, 1996, pp.37-8).
Since short-term nominal interest rates are close to zero, the opportunity for an
expansionary monetary policy to boost private investment is commonly argued to be
unavailable. To be sure, at near zero interest rates, an increase in the quantity of
money will have no discernible impact on nominal interest rates and thus on
physical investment. This is so, because at a given level of income and wealth, the
only way people will be induced to increase their money holdings is to reduce the
price of money, i.e. short-term nominal interest rates. This however cannot occur if
these rates are at or close to zero (as they cannot be negative). This so-called
Keynesian ‘liquidity trap’ - whereby demand consistently falls short of productive
capacity despite near zero nominal interest rates (or alternately, planned aggregate
savings exceeds planned investment plus net exports) - was much in vogue during
the Great Depression. It seems to leave fiscal policy - i.e. reducing tax burdens
and/or boosting government expenditures - as the sole means of reflating the
economy.
The effectiveness of reducing tax burdens as a means of augmenting private
expenditure may be limited due to the so-called `Ricardian Equivalence’ proposition.
Loosely speaking, this proposition states that people, being forward-looking
(rational), will realise that the decrease in tax rates today must be offset by an
increase in rates some time in the future (in recognition of the intertemporal
government budget constraint needing to hold in the long-term). Thus, for tax cuts17
to possibly have any significant impact in boosting consumption and aggregate
demand, they must be viewed as being permanent
22. In light of the growing
budgetary imbalance and burgeoning public debt, - which has grown to over 100
percent of GDP (Charts 10 and 11 respectively)
23 - Rudiger Dornbusch (1997) has
gone so far as to suggest that Japan is faced with an outright ‘fiscal crisis’. Against
this backdrop, pronouncements of the permanence of tax cuts may lack credibility
24.
This lack-of-credibility-problem is particularly prevalent when there is
significant pessimism about the growth prospects on the one hand, and realisation
that households will be faced with at least some part of the burden in cleaning up
the financial sector on the other. Also, the policy reversals by the Japanese
authorities - for instance, a tax hike in 1997 immediately after the fiscal stimulus the
previous year - will in all probability make tax cuts ineffective in raising demand (i.e.
the bulk of the tax relief may be saved). This is particularly so, to the extent that the
Japanese are saving for old-age in the anticipation of insufficient funds in the
government’s kitty to finance social security benefits, and the consequent expected
rise in the ratio of social security payment costs (Kihara, 1998)
25. Indeed, the former
                                           
22 There are obviously a number of reasons for the Ricardian Equivalence proposition not to
hold in reality (see for instance, Barro, 1989). For instance, people may not be ‘forward
looking’ (i.e. they may be myopic), they may be liquidity constrained (such that a tax break
now will, by relieving this constraint, in fact lead to increased spending), and so forth. The
important point though is that this proposition does emphasise that a tax break may not
necessarily be seen as a pure windfall gain, thus precluding as large (if any) an increase in
spending as might be hoped for.
23 It has been suggested that once unfunded state pension liabilities are included, the total
obligations of the public sector may exceed 250 percent (Plender, 1998).
24 Japan’s budgetary balance has been in deficit since 1993, ballooning in 1996 (Table 9). In
some part, this may be attributed to cyclical factors (i.e. reduction in tax revenues during
downturns), as well as the ¥14 trillion September 1995 fiscal stimulus package, which
incidentally did help temporarily boost growth in 1996 to 3.9 percent (Chart 1). Part of the
growth-boost was also due to a ‘front-loading’ of consumer spending and capital investment
in anticipation of an expected hike in the consumption tax rate from 3 to 5 percent (which
actually took place in April 1997). This bringing-forward of expenditures in turn contributed to
the particularly weak demand in 1997-98 (JRI, 1997b).
25 As of 1995, Japan had the world’s highest life expectancy (76.2 for men, 82.8 for women).
Its fertility rate was 1.42, far lower than the 2.07 required for population replacement. As
such, latest estimates suggest that the elderly population ratio will continue to rise until it
peaks at about 32 percent by year 2050 (Kihara, 1998).18
Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto, reportedly made mention of this in late 1997
as rationale for his original aim to cut the budget deficit to 3 percent by 2004 as part
of The Fiscal Structural Reform Law enacted in 1996. Consequently, the public
awareness of this potential concern has been aroused. Therefore, for tax cuts to
have any chance of being effective, they must be permanent, and more importantly,
need to be viewed as such by the public
26. The latter suggests that if such a policy
is undertaken, it must be accompanied by unambiguous statements by policy-
makers about the permanent nature of the cuts (see footnote 39).
In late April 1998, the Japanese authorities announced a ¥16.7 trillion fiscal
stimulus package (or about 3 percent of GDP). The package consisted mainly of
expenditures on public works, and was the fifth such measure since October 1997
(EIU, 1998b). The Ricardian Equivalence proposition noted previously may once
again dampen its effectiveness. Specifically, to the extent that forward-looking
agents are concerned that such government spending expansions will necessitate
an equivalent rise in taxes in the future (in present value terms), the net effect of
this policy may be further diluted. In addition, given the gross structural inefficiencies
in the economy, the effective multiplier effects of these projects much be
questioned. Indeed, public sector fixed investment already accounts for almost 8
percent of Japan’s GDP, far higher than other industrial economies (Chart 16).
Insert Chart 16
While a detailed exploration is beyond the scope of this paper, at the least,
fiscal expenditures ought to be focused on directly improving living standards, such
as urban housing conditions, which are not commensurate with the per capita
                                                                                                                            
26 See JRI (1998) for a discussion of concrete steps towards large-scale tax reductions and
other proposals for stimulating growth in Japan. Admittedly, it is not merely a permanent tax
relief, but also a revamping of the entire tax code - which is too narrowly based (the burden19
income of an average Japanese household. This may also help improve consumer
sentiments, hence contributing indirectly to increased domestic demand.
5. Monetary Policy Reconsidered
As initially alluded to by John Makin (1996) of the American Enterprise
Institute, and more recently, by prominent Japanese academic and member of Bank
of Japan’s (BOJ’s) nine-member policy board, Kazuo Ueda (see Tett, 1998a), MIT
economist Paul Krugman (1998b) and elaborated and formalised by Krugman
(1998a), monetary policy may have a role to play in boosting demand. This is so, as
while the short-term nominal interest rate may be near-zero and downwardly rigid
(for reasons noted above), what is important for investment (and possibly
consumption) is the real interest rate. Specifically, by the ‘Fisher identity’, we have
that the real interest rate approximately equals nominal interest rate minus expected
inflation. More generally, the Fisher identity is a specific application of the fact that
that the nominal variable can be transformed into a real variable with an appropriate
price index
27.
Hence, if an expansionary policy leads to positive expected inflation and
nominal interest rates are near-zero, real interest rates will be negative. This
negative cost of capital ought to stimulate private investment. In addition, insofar as
the interest effect on savings exceeds the income effect, household savings may be
reduced, consequently raising consumption. Even abstracting from this interest rate
channel, as long as consumers expect goods (particularly durables and ‘luxuries’) to
                                                                                                                            
falling mainly on corporations and households) - that is required.
27 To be specific, the Fisher identity is as follows:
(1 + r) = (1 + i)/(1 + ￿ ￿
e) ,
where r = real interest rates; i = nominal interest rate; and ￿
e = expected inflation rate.
If  ￿
e is ‘sufficiently low’, often the cross product term (r￿
e) is ignored. We then obtain the
desired result that:
r = (i - ￿ ￿
e)20
cost more tomorrow compared to today, they will bring forward consumption, hence
boosting demand and output.
The subtle yet critical point to note is that it is not sufficient merely to
increase money supply. Rather, there must be such a large injection of liquidity that
there is a general expectation of inflationary conditions. Only then will real interest
rates be reduced (become negative). This is a non-negligible issue, as currently the
recessionary conditions do imply that there are expectations of unchanging prices, if
not outright deflation
28. Thus, to be credible in creating inflationary expectations, not
only must there be large monetary injections, these must be accompanied by
unequivocal statements by policy-makers to that effect. As noted by Krugman
(1998a), “(t)he way to make monetary policy effective...is for the central bank to
credibly promise to be irresponsible - to make a persuasive case that it will permit
inflation to occur, thereby producing the negative real interest rates the economy
needs”
29.
Kazuo Ueda has reportedly proposed the possible introduction of a target for
inflation or the monetary base. His suggestion is for a 15 percent growth in the
monetary base or an inflation rate of about 1.5 percent (Tett, 1998a). It is unclear
from the source as to whether Ueda is talking about inflation as measured by
changes in the wholesale or consumer prices, given that the latter has generally
                                                                                                                            
28 Specifically, the substitution effect states that a fall in real interest rates will lead to savings
becoming less attractive relative to consumption (as you get a lower return per $ saved). The
income effect states that a fall in real interest rates will mean that, for given savings,
expected wealth/income will now be lower (due to reduced returns on a given level of
savings). Thus, to the extent that people save in order to obtain a certain level of income
over their life-times, they will now be induced to save more to make up this implicit loss in
income. There is a third effect, known as the intertemporal substitution effect. This effect
states that a fall in real interest rates, if seen as temporary, will induce agents to work less, as
they realise that the savings they make now will obtain a lower return than if done in the
future. Admittedly, the empirical relevance of the effect of real interest rate changes on work
effort is dubious (and entirely absent in the case of a permanent tax change).
29 Given that the BOJ is recognised as being one of the least independent central bank (from
the government) in comparison to other central banks in the industrialised economies, the
use of monetary policy for domestic stabilisation is institutionally feasible.21
been higher than the former (see Chart 4)
30. However, to the extent that the
consumer price index (CPI) generally tends to overstate inflation by between 1 to 2
percent, a 1.5 percent CPI-based inflation rate would only imply price stability.
Therefore, given the need to ‘create inflation’, the numerical target in focus ought
appropriately to be the wholesale price index (WPI) or a 3-4 percent target rate of
the CPI (given the approximately 200 basis points difference between them in
1998)
31.
Targeting the inflation rate is probably preferable to that of the monetary
base. This is so, as one might expect the money multiplier to increase if and when
the economy picks up, as banks will be less inclined to hold as large ‘excess
reserves’ (i.e. over and above the legally mandated reserve requirements), while
individuals may choose to hold less cash (or place a lower proportion of savings in
the postal savings institution or in foreign currency deposits at home or abroad), as
their confidence in the durability of the financial system grows
32. In other words, if
                                           
30 In general, differences between the %CPI and %WPI (where %CPI > %WPI) may at least
partly be explained by the so-termed ‘Balassa effect’. Generally, the CPI reflects a weighted
average of the prices of both tradables (PT) and nontradables (PNT), while the WPI captures
only/mainly tradable goods. Let a be the proportion of the tradables sector in the economy.
Thus:
%CPI  =  a(%PT) + (1 - a)%(PNT)
%WPI =  (%PT)
(%CPI - %WPI) = (1-a)(%PNT - %PT)
According to Balassa (1964), the productivity growth in the tradables sector should outpace
that in the nontradables sector (haircuts being the usual example). Accordingly, %PNT > %PT,
such that %CPI > %WPI.
31 It is argued that Ueda’s proposal is not for inflation per se, but rather, to prevent outright
deflation - popularly termed ‘price destruction’ or ‘kakaku hakai’ in Japan - (The Economist,
July 25, 1998, p.84). However this contention seems to contradict the suggestion by Ueda of
a positive target inflation rate as discussed above (also see Tett, 1998a). Regardless, as with
Krugman, we take the position of the need for explicit inflation, so as to keep real interest
rates negative.
32 Indeed, the BOJ reportedly noted that the households’ preference to hold cash (or place it
in the postal savings system) is “in line with...(their)...persistent anxiety regarding the
financial system and economic conditions” (quoted in EIU, 1998b, p.34). Similarly, there has
recently been some concern that Japanese households have been moving some of their22
the policy does help stimulate growth and general optimism about the economic
prospects, the money multiplier ought also to rise. As such, one could envisage an
initially large growth in high powered money (given expected low money multiplier),
followed by slower growth rates as the economy picks up and presumably, the
multiplier increases
33 (Chart 17 reveals the procyclical nature of Japan’s credit
multiplier).
Insert Chart 17
An important caveat should be noted. The potential effectiveness of such an
inflation-inducing strategy will probably be greatest if viewed as ‘temporary’, thus
encouraging front-loading of consumption expenditures
34,. This is so, because if
inflation is assumed to be ‘temporary’, presumably the substitution effect of the real
interest decline (which induces greater consumption) ought to dominate the income
effect (which induces lower consumption), as the income decline will not be viewed
as permanent (substantial?). (We abstract from the intertemporal substitution effect,
which, as noted, is probably not significant in practice). Admittedly, the practical
implementation of such a technically desirable strategy is questionable. This is so,
as the only way of getting people to develop positive inflationary expectations is, as
noted, through a commitment by the BOJ to a sustained target inflation
rate/monetary base growth. Pragmatism therefore suggests that the Ueda-proposal
of a permanent  target inflation rate may be desirable.
                                                                                                                            
savings into foreign currency deposits in Japan or even entirely out of the country, as the yen
fell to a new eight year low, hovering at about 147 to the US$ (Strom, 1998).
33 Growth in money supply (M2 + CDs) in Japan has annually averaged about 3.5 percent
since 1995 (ICR, 1998).
34 Over the longer-term, as the economy responds to the stimulus, prices and nominal
interest rates will adjust such that real interest rates are constant and determined only by ‘real
variables’. In other words, the so-called ‘monetary neutrality’ proposition has to hold in the23
5.1 Potential Drawbacks of ‘Inflation-Inducing’ Monetary Policy
While the above policy seems logically consistent, are there other potential
problems in its implementation? Three problems of potential significance seem to
immediately stand out.
First, creating inflationary expectations could conceivably lead to socio-
political instabilities. This may occur because inflationary expectations need to be
created prior to any possible boost in output. Thus, even if the policy could be
potentially successful (from a purely technical perspective), to the extent that it
requires a period of actual or perceived stagnation (i.e. creating inflation on the one
hand and the ongoing recession on the other), questions remain regarding how the
polity will respond to this.
Second, there is the almost-instinctive repulsion from any policy that is
potentially inflationary. This view is understandable, given the oft-noted statement
that inflation is like toothpaste - easy to squeeze out, but extremely difficult
(sometimes impossible?) to put back in. The wariness among Japanese policy-
makers of an ‘overly loose’ monetary policy is particularly keen, in light of the fact
that excessive policy-induced liquidity was the primary cause of the, now infamous,
asset price bubble of the 1980s (Kawai, 1997 and Kon-ya, 1995)
35. However, as
noted, the aggregate demand policies are but one side of the coin. In the longer-
run, the supply-side initiatives ought to boost productive capacity, thus moderating
any short-term inflationary pressures created. Further, the aim of this policy is not to
create double-digit inflation, but rather, some ‘small, positive’ rate.
Third, it may be argued that higher inflation could lead to further weakness in
the yen. This conclusion is however not unambiguous. Specifically, as noted,
expansionary monetary policy in this case ought not to lead to a perceptible decline
                                                                                                                            
long-run (to put this crudely, in the long-run, nominal variables have no real effects).
35 The expansionary monetary policy was initiated following the Louvre Accord of February24
in nominal interest rates (which is the whole point of the discussion). Thus, insofar
as relative interest rate differentials (between Japan and the US) are unchanged,
there ought to be no appreciable downward pressure on the yen. Indeed, to the
extent that the policy, if successful, could reduce bearishness regarding Japan’s
growth prospects, the yen may actually be somewhat strengthened
36. Admittedly, if
exchange rates depend on the inflation rate differentials (i.e.  the purchasing power
parity or PPP theorem), there may be a further decline in the US$ value of the yen.
However, apart from the question of the short-term validity of the PPP theorem (see
Flood and Taylor, 1996 and Rogoff, 1996 among many others), the caveats noted
in the previous paragraph hold
37.
6. Summary and Concluding Observations
Two non-trivial assumptions have been made in this paper. First, that the
new Japanese administration under Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi is firmly committed
to the recovery of the Japanese economy. Second, that the policy-makers are able
to wrest control from those in the bureaucracy which have hitherto generally resisted
radical changes (see for instance, The Economist, March 21, 1998, pp.23-5 and
Landers, 1988b). If these conditions are met, we have emphasised that Japanese
policy-makers must undertake a two-pronged attack:
a) boost aggregate demand in the short-term;
                                                                                                                            
1987 agreed by the G-7 countries as a means of weakening the yen.
36 Implicit in the above statement is the uncovered interest parity theorem (UIP). Briefly,
assume two countries, Japan (¥) and US ($). Let the expected bilateral exchange rate (¥ per
$) = S
e. Let i¥ = Japanese nominal interest rates and i$ = US interest rates. Let RP
e =
expected risk premium of yen relative to US$. The UIP simply states that D DS
e = (i¥ - i$) +
D DRp
e.
37 Indeed, the current economic policies (or lack thereof) have in any case, led to recent
historic lows of the US$ value of the yen. There have been suggestions that the recent yen
depreciations have to some extent, been ‘actively encouraged’ by the Japanese authorities
as an indirect means of creating inflation. Given low yields on Japanese bonds (see Chart
12) compared to US Treasury securities, interest parity condition (see footnote 36) implies
that there is a general expectation of yen undervaluation, i.e. the yen is expected to
appreciate over time. This conclusion is fortified by the PPP theorem, which suggests a long-
run exchange rate of about 125-135 yen per US$.25
b) ensure that the financial sector is restructured and various economic
rigidities are relieved, as part of a larger repertoire of reforms to ensure
enhanced flexibility and competitiveness of the economy in the future.
While the steps to be taken for long-run competitiveness and economic
revitalisation are clear (with the only doubt being about whether and how effectively
they are implemented), those needed to boost aggregate demand in the short-run
are far less so.
Given near-zero nominal interest rates in Japan, most observers argue that
expansionary monetary policy will be ineffective. However, once a distinction is
made between real and nominal interest rates, it has been argued that it is logically
possible for monetary policy to be effective in raising demand if it is able to create
inflationary expectations (which drives a wedge between real and nominal interest
rates). This may be done by explicit announcements by the BOJ of the intention to
target a certain inflation rate in the future
38.
Admittedly, there is no ‘free lunch’, and we have discussed potential
negative repercussions of such a strategy. However, in the final analysis, it is
grossly insufficient to highlight the dangers of this proposed policy per se. Rather,
its drawbacks must be compared to those of other viable alternatives. For reasons
underscored previously, a ‘do-nothing’ status quo is clearly a hazardous alternative
in the face of the acute economic problems (crises) faced by Japan and the rest of
East Asia. This leaves expansionary fiscal policy as the only viable alternative.
The new Finance Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa recently announced a planned
cut in corporate and income taxes of over ¥6 trillion, that would be permanent. In his
maiden policy speech to parliament, the new Japanese premier reportedly reiterated
the intention to cuts taxes “substantially more” than ¥6 trillion (with income tax cuts
                                           
38 Indeed, in recognition of the above-noted liquidity trap, Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson
(1998) has suggested that the Japanese authorities print new domestic yen notes and26
to begin in January 1999 and the corporate tax cut in April 1999). He reportedly also
announced the intention to increase extra budgetary expenditures by about ¥10
trillion (Rowley, 1998b).
While details are yet unavailable, the mention of ‘permanent’ tax cuts is
important. Nevertheless, as discussed, a number of questions remain about
potential effectiveness of fiscal policy in achieving the necessary end, given the lack
of credibility due to policy reversals and general uncertainties regarding economic
conditions (thus the term ‘fiscal stimulus fatigue’ is probably apt). Even if potentially
effective, the already burgeoning fiscal deficit and gross public debt, against the
backdrop of a rapidly graying population (which will further add to public spending
burden), sharply limits the scope for fiscal policy to be used in isolation as a credible
reflationary tool. Indeed, it is revealing that no mention was made of how the latest
fiscal expansion stimulus would be financed, bringing the credibility (and thus
potential effectiveness) of the stimulus measures into question. As with other
packages, there may be a direct demand boost to government expenditure, but the
focus needs to be on boosting private investment and consumption. Indeed, the
Bank of Japan reportedly also noted that “(t)he positive influence of the (fiscal)
package on private demand will likely be limited” (Straits Times, August 14, 1998).
Accordingly, ‘inflation inducing’ monetary policy ought at least to be given
serious consideration in combination with the latest fiscal stimuli measures
(particularly in the form of permanent tax reductions)
39. Importantly, the authorities
                                                                                                                            
distribute them to the public under the stipulation that they will become redundant/valueless if
not spent within six months (so as to ensure that the windfall is not saved).
39 In fact, the yen and Japanese stock market rallied initially when it was reported that
Hashimoto had suggested the possibility of “permanent income tax cuts” on July 3, and
foreign minister Keizo Obuchi supposedly reiterated the position. However on July 6,
Hashimoto ‘clarified’ his position, noting that he was originally misquoted. According to him,
he had referred to a “permanent reform of the tax system”, which did not necessarily include
a permanent tax cut (Robinson and Tett, 1998). To add to the confusion, on July 8,
apparently under pressure from his political party (the LDP), Hashimoto declared that he did
in fact intend to cut taxes permanently as part of an overhaul of the tax system. No details
were given as to what form the tax cuts would take or how the fiscal shortfall would be27
must not lose sight of the need to undertake appropriate financial and related
economic restructuring for the promotion of long-term growth.
There has been much criticism that Japan has not paid sufficient attention to
the regional economic crisis, being ‘solely’ pre-occupied by its own domestic
agenda. While some of the criticism has a ring of truth to it (particularly the noted
extreme reluctance by Japanese banks to help restructure debt obligations), it ought
not to be exaggerated. The Japanese government has been the largest single
country contributor to the IMF-orchestrated financial assistance packages to the
most afflicted East Asian economies (Table 4). Further, when the Japanese
authorities have attempted to take potentially useful regional initiatives, they have
been thwarted by the US-IMF combine
40.
This notwithstanding, the depth and breadth of the East Asian financial crisis
has added a sense of acute urgency for some concrete and credible measures by
policy-makers to revitalise the Japanese economy. A rejuvenated Japan is the key
to providing the region the growth stimulus it is in such dire need of. Therefore, the
best thing Japanese policy-makers can do for the region is to focus earnestly on
stimulating their economy in the short-run, while taking the necessary steps towards
economic restructuring, so as to ensure sustained growth over the medium- and
longer-runs. In the final analysis, the best way for Japan to assist the rest of East
                                                                                                                            
overcome. Not surprisingly, the markets remained skeptical and did not react positively
(Shirouzu, 1998). Political observers have suggested that this apparent dithering by
Hashimoto on economic policy, along with Japan seemingly being side-lined in recent US-
China talks (with there being suggestions of the formation of a new ‘strategic alliance’ in Asia
between these two countries), may have contributed to the LDP’s recent electoral drubbing in
the upper-house.
40 For instance, the Japanese government did initiate an ’Asian Monetary Fund’ (AMF) to
provide a pool of resources to assist regional currencies under selling pressure and provide
necessary liquidity to relieve the acute credit crunches in the region. However, according to
Altbach (1997), they quickly abandoned this initiative following reported ‘outright rejection’ of
the idea by the US Treasury. The US seems to have been worried about the proposal
possibly undermining the regional ‘influence’ of the IMF - and therefore that of the US
government?  (see Jagdish Bhagwati, 1998, who suggests the existence of an IMF-US
Treasury complex). -  There are indications that the new minister is attempting to revive the
AMF proposal (Rowley, 1998c).28
Asia during this period of turmoil, is for it to first get its own house in order.29
Table 4
IMF-Led International Financial Assistance Committed  to
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia
a, June-July 1998
($ billions)












IMF disbursements as of 10 June 1998
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    10.0
      4.0
    23.3
      5.0
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      6.3
      1.0
      1.0
    58.2









  China, P.R.C.




IMF disbursements as of 15 July 1998
     9.9
     4.5
     3.5
   18.7
     3.0
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     1.0
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     1.0
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     1.5
     1.2
   10.5
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     1.0
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     0.5
     0.5
     1.0
     1.0
   17.1
     2.8
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   17.8
     2.8
   10.0
   20.0
   50.6
Sources: Compiled by author from IMF (1998a,b), IMF News Briefs,
  various issues and Goldstein and Hawkins (1998)30
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